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Single Idea 12796

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions ]

Full Idea

It is sometimes claimed that the behaviour of definite non-count descriptions shows Russell's Theory of Descriptions itself to be false. ....but it isn't a general theory of descriptions, but precisely a theory of singular descriptions.

Gist of Idea

Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars

Source

comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Henry Laycock - Words without Objects 3.1

Book Ref

Laycock,Henry: 'Words without Objects' [OUP 2006], p.101


The 46 ideas from 'On Denoting'

Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer]
"Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan]
Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke]
Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer]
Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell]
Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach]
Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell]
Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell]
Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury]
The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine]
Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan]
Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey]
The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich]
Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell]
Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh]
Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A]
Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G]
Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell]
The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell]
Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell]
Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk]
Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell]
Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn]
Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B]
The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk]
Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell]
If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell]
A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati]
Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell]
By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke]
Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell]
Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati]
'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A]
The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan]
Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell]
Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell]
Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer]
The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames]
'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan]
The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell]
Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell]
In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell]
The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell]
In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell]