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Single Idea 12812

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence ]

Full Idea

This I do say, that there are real constitutions in things from whence simple ideas flow, which we observe combin'd in them. But we distinguish particular substances into sorts or genera not by real essences or constitutions, but by observed simple ideas.

Gist of Idea

Things have real essences, but we categorise them according to the ideas we receive

Source

John Locke (Letters to William Molyneux [1692], 1693.01.20)

Book Ref

'Leibniz: Critical and Interpretive Essays', ed/tr. Hooker,Michael [Manchester 1982], p.179


A Reaction

This is the clearest statement I can find of Locke's position on essences. He is totally committed to their reality, but strongly aware of the empirical constraints which keep us from direct knowledge of them. He would be amazed by modern discoveries.


The 29 ideas with the same theme [essence as derived from experiences of objects]:

If you remove the accidents from a horse and a lion, the intellect can't tell them apart [Francis of Marchia]
The feature which picks out or names a thing is usually called its 'essence' [Hobbes]
Real essence explains observable qualities, but not what kind of thing it is [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
If essence is 'nominal', artificial gold (with its surface features) would qualify as 'gold' [Locke, by Eagle]
'Nominal essence' is everything contained in the idea of a particular sort of thing [Locke, by Copi]
The observable qualities are never the real essence, since they depend on real essence [Locke]
In nominal essence, Locke confuses the set of properties with the abstracted idea of them [Eagle on Locke]
Locke's real and nominal essence refers back to Aristotle's real and nominal definitions [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
Nominal Essence is the abstract idea to which a name is attached [Locke]
Essences relate to sorting words; if you replace those with names, essences vanish [Locke]
Real essences are unknown, so only the nominal essence connects things to a species [Locke]
To be a nominal essence, a complex idea must exhibit unity [Locke]
Our ideas of substance are based on mental archetypes, but these come from the world [Locke]
For 'all gold is malleable' to be necessary, it must be part of gold's nominal essence [Locke]
Things have real essences, but we categorise them according to the ideas we receive [Locke]
We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz]
If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz]
Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley]
In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi]
'Real essence' makes it what it is; 'nominal essence' makes us categorise it a certain way [Ellis]
The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting [Wiggins]
Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual [Wiggins]
Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences' [Dennett]
We distinguish objects by their attributes, not by their essences [Shalkowski]
We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it [Ladyman/Ross]
If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle]
Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle]
Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle]
Kripke and Putnam offer an intermediary between real and nominal essences [Almog]