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Full Idea
If we reject extensionality in mereology, it has as a consequence that more than one object may have exactly the same parts at the same time, and hence occupy the same position.
Clarification
'Extensionality' says 'same parts - same thing'
Gist of Idea
Without extensional mereology two objects can occupy the same position
Source
Peter Simons (Parts [1987], Intro)
Book Ref
Simons,Peter: 'Parts: a Study in Ontology' [OUP 1987], p.3
A Reaction
Simons defends this claim. I'm unconvinced that we must choose between the two views. The same parts should ensure the same physical essence, which seems to guarantee the same identity. Not any old parts generate an essence.
| 16796 | Locke may accept coinciding material substances, such as body, man and person [Locke, by Pasnau] |
| 12970 | We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz] |
| 14744 | Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Wiggins, by Sider] |
| 14750 | Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider] |
| 13401 | The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism [Jubien] |
| 12024 | If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G] |
| 16080 | Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker] |
| 13918 | Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe] |
| 14743 | The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider] |
| 12820 | Without extensional mereology two objects can occupy the same position [Simons] |