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Single Idea 12896

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism ]

Full Idea

The context-sensitivity of knowledge is inherited from one of its components, i.e. justification.

Gist of Idea

Knowledge is context-sensitive, because justification is

Source

Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended [2005], p.68)

Book Ref

'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology', ed/tr. Steup,M/Sosa,E [Blackwell 2005], p.68


A Reaction

I think this is exactly right - that there is nothing relative or contextual about what is actually true, or what someone believes, but knowleddge is wholly relative because it rests on shifting standards of justification.


The 8 ideas from Stewart Cohen

Our own intuitions about whether we know tend to vacillate [Cohen,S]
We shouldn't jump too quickly to a contextualist account of claims to know [Cohen,S]
The context sensitivity of knowledge derives from its justification [Cohen,S]
Contextualists slightly concede scepticism, but only in extremely strict contexts [Cohen,S]
Contextualism is good because it allows knowledge, but bad because 'knowing' is less valued [Cohen,S]
Contextualism says sceptical arguments are true, relative to their strict context [Cohen,S]
There aren't invariant high standards for knowledge, because even those can be raised [Cohen,S]
Knowledge is context-sensitive, because justification is [Cohen,S]