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Full Idea
If you claim that S knows that P, and yet grant that S cannot eliminate a certain possibility of not-P, it certainly seems as if you have granted that S does not after all know that P. To speak of fallible knowledge just sounds contradictory.
Gist of Idea
To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction
Source
David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996], p.419)
Book Ref
Lewis,David: 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' [CUP 1999], p.419
A Reaction
Starting from this point, fallibilism seems to be a rather bold move. The only sensible response seems to be to relax the requirement that not-P must be eliminable. Best: in one epistemic context P, in another not-P.
12898 | Justification is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge [Lewis] |
12895 | Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies [Lewis, by Cohen,S] |
19562 | We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Lewis, by Cohen,S] |
12897 | To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction [Lewis] |
12899 | The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer [Lewis] |