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Single Idea 12911

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts ]

Full Idea

There must always be some basis for the connexion between the terms of a proposition, and it is to be found in their concepts.

Gist of Idea

Concepts are what unite a proposition

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.4/14 X)

Book Ref

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence', ed/tr. Mason,HT/Parkinson,GHR [Manchester UP 1967], p.63

A Reaction

We face the problem that bothered Russell, of the unity of the proposition. We are also led to the question of HOW our concepts connect the parts of a proposition. Do concepts have valencies? Are they incomplete, as Frege suggests?

The 28 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about concepts]:

20804 Concepts are intellectual phantasms [Stoic school, by Ps-Plutarch]
12911 Concepts are what unite a proposition [Leibniz]
17616 Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind [Kant]
5553 Either experience creates concepts, or concepts make experience possible [Kant]
5593 Reason generates no concepts, but frees them from their link to experience in the understanding [Kant]
15607 We don't think with concepts - we think the concepts [Hegel]
15610 Active thought about objects produces the universal, which is what is true and essential of it [Hegel]
20953 Every concept depends on the counter-concepts of what it is not [Hegel, by Bowie]
8715 Infinities expand the bounds of the conceivable; we explore concepts to explore conceivability [Cantor, by Friend]
23189 Concepts are rough groups of simultaneous sensations [Nietzsche]
23192 Concepts don’t match one thing, but many things a little bit [Nietzsche]
9870 Early Frege takes the extensions of concepts for granted [Frege, by Dummett]
5384 A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept' [Russell]
16366 The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans]
8245 The logical attitude tries to turn concepts into functions, when they are really forms or forces [Deleuze/Guattari]
13865 'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C]
13866 A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C]
16535 A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe]
10344 Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself? [Kusch]
10110 Corresponding to every concept there is a class (some of them sets) [George/Velleman]
17980 The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy]
16365 Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati]
8688 Concepts can be presented extensionally (as objects) or intensionally (as a characterization) [Friend]
19088 For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth]
11120 Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence]
18574 Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different [Machery]
18588 Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location [Machery]
18611 We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery]