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Single Idea 12969

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties ]

Full Idea

Powers which are not essential to substance, and which include not merely an aptitude but also a certain endeavour, are exactly what are or should be meant by 'real qualities'.

Gist of Idea

The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities'

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.23)

Book Ref

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'New Essays on Human Understanding', ed/tr. Remnant/Bennett [CUP 1996], p.226


A Reaction

An important part of Leibniz's account. There are thus essential powers, in the 'depth' of the substance, and more peripheral powers, which also initiate action, and give rise to the qualities. The second must derive from the first?

Related Idea

Idea 12999 Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz]


The 29 ideas with the same theme [relation between powers and our view of properties]:

Potentiality in geometry is metaphorical [Aristotle]
The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities' [Leibniz]
A thing has no properties if it has no effect on other 'things' [Nietzsche]
Properties endow a ball with qualities, and with powers or dispositions [Martin,CB]
Qualities and dispositions are aspects of properties - what it exhibits, and what it does [Martin,CB]
Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong]
Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE]
Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects [Ellis]
Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional [Shoemaker, by Ellis]
A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers [Shoemaker]
'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional [Shoemaker]
The identity of a property concerns its causal powers [Shoemaker]
Properties are clusters of conditional powers [Shoemaker]
Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing? [Shoemaker]
If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination [Shoemaker]
The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts [Shoemaker]
Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects [Shoemaker]
Shoemaker moved from properties as powers to properties bestowing powers [Shoemaker, by Mumford/Anjum]
Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim]
Properties are causes [Crane]
Are all properties powers, or are there also qualities, or do qualities have the powers? [Heil]
Properties are both qualitative and dispositional - they are powerful qualities [Heil]
All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford]
Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford]
Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne]
Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne]
If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne]
Rather than pure powers or pure categoricals, I favour basics which are both at once [Williams,NE]
Powers are more complicated than properties which are always on display [Williams,NE]