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Single Idea 12975

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence ]

Full Idea

That gold is a metal which resists cupellation and is insoluble in aquafortis is a distinct idea, for it gives us the criteria or definition of 'gold'. But it is not a perfect idea, because we know too little about cupellation and actions of aquafortis.

Gist of Idea

We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.31)

Book Ref

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'New Essays on Human Understanding', ed/tr. Remnant/Bennett [CUP 1996], p.267

A Reaction

This connects the 'perfect idea' of something with knowing its active substance, and hence its essence. See Idea 12976 for the connection between perfect ideas and definitions.

Related Ideas

Idea 12976 If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz]

Idea 12977 We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz]

Idea 12983 A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz]

The 29 ideas with the same theme [essence as derived from experiences of objects]:

16627 If you remove the accidents from a horse and a lion, the intellect can't tell them apart [Francis of Marchia]
17251 The feature which picks out or names a thing is usually called its 'essence' [Hobbes]
16031 Real essence explains observable qualities, but not what kind of thing it is [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
15646 If essence is 'nominal', artificial gold (with its surface features) would qualify as 'gold' [Locke, by Eagle]
12306 'Nominal essence' is everything contained in the idea of a particular sort of thing [Locke, by Copi]
15988 The observable qualities are never the real essence, since they depend on real essence [Locke]
15644 In nominal essence, Locke confuses the set of properties with the abstracted idea of them [Eagle on Locke]
16029 Locke's real and nominal essence refers back to Aristotle's real and nominal definitions [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
12531 Nominal Essence is the abstract idea to which a name is attached [Locke]
13433 Essences relate to sorting words; if you replace those with names, essences vanish [Locke]
12533 Real essences are unknown, so only the nominal essence connects things to a species [Locke]
12537 To be a nominal essence, a complex idea must exhibit unity [Locke]
12557 Our ideas of substance are based on mental archetypes, but these come from the world [Locke]
12561 For 'all gold is malleable' to be necessary, it must be part of gold's nominal essence [Locke]
12812 Things have real essences, but we categorise them according to the ideas we receive [Locke]
12975 We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz]
12805 If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz]
12806 Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley]
12308 In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi]
5448 'Real essence' makes it what it is; 'nominal essence' makes us categorise it a certain way [Ellis]
11835 The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting [Wiggins]
16510 Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual [Wiggins]
7384 Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences' [Dennett]
14226 We distinguish objects by their attributes, not by their essences [Shalkowski]
14951 We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it [Ladyman/Ross]
15642 If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle]
15645 Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle]
15643 Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle]
17869 Kripke and Putnam offer an intermediary between real and nominal essences [Almog]