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Single Idea 12981
[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
]
Full Idea
Essence is fundamentally nothing but the possibility of the thing under consideration. Something which is thought possible is expressed by a definition.
Gist of Idea
Essence is just the possibility of a thing
Source
Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.03)
Book Ref
Leibniz,Gottfried: 'New Essays on Human Understanding', ed/tr. Remnant/Bennett [CUP 1996], p.293
A Reaction
It is unclear whether he means 'possible modes of existence' or 'possible actions of the thing'. Leibniz sees more clearly than Aristotle that essences extend beyond the actual thing, because Leibniz is more aware of the active powers.
Related Idea
Idea 13087
The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
The
21 ideas
with the same theme
[essence just is the successful definition of a thing]:
21259
|
To grasp a thing we need its name, its definition, and what it really is
[Plato]
|
10963
|
A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition
[Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
|
11292
|
Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition
[Aristotle]
|
11287
|
Essence is what is stated in the definition
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
12091
|
If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
12146
|
Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences
[Aristotle]
|
11200
|
The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form
[Aquinas]
|
17865
|
Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula
[Descartes, by Almog]
|
12981
|
Essence is just the possibility of a thing
[Leibniz]
|
23647
|
Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define
[Reid]
|
12067
|
An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition
[Witt]
|
14260
|
An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object
[Fine,K]
|
11179
|
If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence
[Fine,K]
|
16551
|
Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition
[Lowe]
|
17309
|
For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions
[Koslicki]
|
17315
|
We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions
[Koslicki]
|
17866
|
Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths
[Almog]
|
17868
|
Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases
[Almog]
|
17871
|
Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind
[Almog]
|
17872
|
Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes
[Almog]
|
17953
|
Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates
[Vetter]
|