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Full Idea
The essence of gold is what constitutes it and gives it the sensible qualities which let us recognize it and which make its nominal definition; but if we could explain this structure or inner constitution we would possess the real, causal definition.
Gist of Idea
A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure
Source
Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.03)
Book Ref
Leibniz,Gottfried: 'New Essays on Human Understanding', ed/tr. Remnant/Bennett [CUP 1996], p.294
A Reaction
This is the view which I am championing, particularly in the role of explanation in the whole game. Explanation and understanding are the hallmarks of the discovery of a real essence. However, a falsehood may explain things well. Tricky.
Related Ideas
Idea 12975 We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz]
Idea 12977 We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz]
16094 | You can't define particulars, because accounts have to be generalised [Aristotle] |
12983 | A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz] |
4417 | Only that which has no history is definable [Nietzsche] |
16877 | A 'constructive' (as opposed to 'analytic') definition creates a new sign [Frege] |
14426 | A definition by 'extension' enumerates items, and one by 'intension' gives a defining property [Russell] |
13838 | A decent modern definition should always imply a semantics [Hacking] |
11221 | A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta] |
11224 | Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta] |
11226 | Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta] |
9143 | Implicit definitions must be satisfiable, creative definitions introduce things, contextual definitions build on things [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
10143 | 'Creative definitions' do not presuppose the existence of the objects defined [Fine,K] |