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Single Idea 12983

[filed under theme 2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition ]

Full Idea

The essence of gold is what constitutes it and gives it the sensible qualities which let us recognize it and which make its nominal definition; but if we could explain this structure or inner constitution we would possess the real, causal definition.

Gist of Idea

A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.03)

Book Ref

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'New Essays on Human Understanding', ed/tr. Remnant/Bennett [CUP 1996], p.294


A Reaction

This is the view which I am championing, particularly in the role of explanation in the whole game. Explanation and understanding are the hallmarks of the discovery of a real essence. However, a falsehood may explain things well. Tricky.

Related Ideas

Idea 12975 We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz]

Idea 12977 We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz]


The 11 ideas with the same theme [whether there are different sorts of definition]:

You can't define particulars, because accounts have to be generalised [Aristotle]
A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz]
Only that which has no history is definable [Nietzsche]
A 'constructive' (as opposed to 'analytic') definition creates a new sign [Frege]
A definition by 'extension' enumerates items, and one by 'intension' gives a defining property [Russell]
A decent modern definition should always imply a semantics [Hacking]
A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta]
Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta]
Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta]
Implicit definitions must be satisfiable, creative definitions introduce things, contextual definitions build on things [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert]
'Creative definitions' do not presuppose the existence of the objects defined [Fine,K]