more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 12991
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
]
Full Idea
I have sometimes been amazed that children can learn languages so early, ...considering how little trouble is taken to instruct children in their native tongue, and how little thought adults give to getting sharp definitions.
Gist of Idea
Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions
Source
Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.10)
Book Ref
Leibniz,Gottfried: 'New Essays on Human Understanding', ed/tr. Remnant/Bennett [CUP 1996], p.341
A Reaction
A striking anticipation of the key observation on which Chomsky built his theories, from a philosopher who was equally concerned to defend innate ideas and innate knowledge.
The
106 ideas
from 'New Essays on Human Understanding'
5056
|
Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity
[Leibniz]
|
5057
|
If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first
[Leibniz]
|
5055
|
No two things are totally identical
[Leibniz]
|
5053
|
The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity
[Leibniz]
|
5054
|
Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination
[Leibniz]
|
5058
|
Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls
[Leibniz]
|
11855
|
Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence
[Leibniz]
|
11856
|
Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject
[Leibniz]
|
12931
|
Particular truths are just instances of general truths
[Leibniz]
|
17079
|
Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source
[Leibniz]
|
4302
|
You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true
[Leibniz]
|
12930
|
The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas
[Leibniz]
|
12929
|
All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses
[Leibniz]
|
12933
|
Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation
[Leibniz]
|
12932
|
The idea of being must come from our own existence
[Leibniz]
|
19360
|
General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking
[Leibniz]
|
12937
|
We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them
[Leibniz]
|
12935
|
Every feeling is the perception of a truth
[Leibniz]
|
12934
|
We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed
[Leibniz]
|
12936
|
There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence
[Leibniz]
|
12944
|
It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions
[Leibniz]
|
12942
|
Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man
[Leibniz]
|
12945
|
Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts
[Leibniz]
|
12938
|
An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things
[Leibniz]
|
12940
|
What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas?
[Leibniz]
|
12941
|
There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act
[Leibniz]
|
12939
|
Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions
[Leibniz]
|
12943
|
Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future
[Leibniz]
|
12946
|
The idea of the will includes the understanding
[Leibniz]
|
19357
|
The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow
[Leibniz]
|
12947
|
We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses
[Leibniz]
|
12948
|
A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause
[Leibniz]
|
19358
|
Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance
[Leibniz]
|
12950
|
We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas
[Leibniz]
|
12949
|
Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist
[Leibniz]
|
12951
|
Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths
[Leibniz]
|
12952
|
Space is an order among actual and possible things
[Leibniz]
|
12953
|
Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs
[Leibniz]
|
12956
|
Only whole numbers are multitudes of units
[Leibniz]
|
12955
|
If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length
[Leibniz]
|
12954
|
God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents
[Leibniz]
|
12957
|
The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful
[Leibniz]
|
12958
|
Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object
[Leibniz]
|
12962
|
Pleasure is a sense of perfection
[Leibniz]
|
19364
|
Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad)
[Leibniz]
|
19368
|
The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it
[Leibniz]
|
12964
|
If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons
[Leibniz]
|
12963
|
Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths
[Leibniz]
|
12959
|
We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers
[Leibniz]
|
12965
|
All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action'
[Leibniz]
|
12960
|
We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them
[Leibniz]
|
19328
|
Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated
[Leibniz]
|
12967
|
I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude
[Leibniz]
|
12966
|
Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided
[Leibniz]
|
12969
|
The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities'
[Leibniz]
|
12968
|
A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates
[Leibniz]
|
12970
|
We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to
[Leibniz]
|
12972
|
Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same
[Leibniz]
|
12971
|
If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation
[Leibniz]
|
13098
|
We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa
[Leibniz]
|
13075
|
No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction
[Leibniz]
|
12973
|
We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps
[Leibniz]
|
12884
|
The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost
[Leibniz]
|
12974
|
People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies
[Leibniz]
|
12976
|
If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions
[Leibniz]
|
12975
|
We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it
[Leibniz]
|
12978
|
A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible
[Leibniz]
|
12977
|
We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply
[Leibniz]
|
12981
|
Essence is just the possibility of a thing
[Leibniz]
|
12982
|
One essence can be expressed by several definitions
[Leibniz]
|
12984
|
Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities
[Leibniz]
|
12983
|
A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure
[Leibniz]
|
12980
|
Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational'
[Leibniz]
|
12979
|
The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them
[Leibniz]
|
12985
|
Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place'
[Leibniz]
|
12986
|
The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect
[Leibniz]
|
12987
|
For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member
[Leibniz]
|
12989
|
Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete
[Leibniz]
|
12988
|
The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony
[Leibniz]
|
12990
|
Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents
[Leibniz]
|
12992
|
Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts
[Leibniz]
|
12993
|
Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations
[Leibniz]
|
12991
|
Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions
[Leibniz]
|
12994
|
Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties
[Leibniz]
|
12995
|
The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know
[Leibniz]
|
12811
|
We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality
[Leibniz]
|
12998
|
Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas
[Leibniz]
|
12996
|
I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C
[Leibniz]
|
12997
|
Analysis is the art of finding the middle term
[Leibniz]
|
12999
|
Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers
[Leibniz]
|
13000
|
Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about
[Leibniz]
|
13002
|
It is always good to reduce the number of axioms
[Leibniz]
|
13001
|
Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement
[Leibniz]
|
13003
|
The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am'
[Leibniz]
|
13006
|
Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy
[Leibniz]
|
13005
|
Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities
[Leibniz]
|
10056
|
At bottom eternal truths are all conditional
[Leibniz]
|
13008
|
Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity
[Leibniz]
|
13009
|
A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth
[Leibniz]
|
12805
|
If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things
[Leibniz]
|
12806
|
Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance?
[Leibniz, by Jolley]
|
12808
|
Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail
[Leibniz]
|
12807
|
The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances
[Leibniz]
|
1414
|
A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit
[Leibniz]
|
21252
|
Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved
[Leibniz]
|
21253
|
Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions
[Leibniz]
|