more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 12998

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding ]

Full Idea

Ordinarily, when ideas are thoroughly understood, their agreements and disagreements are apparent.

Gist of Idea

Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 4.02)

Book Ref

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'New Essays on Human Understanding', ed/tr. Remnant/Bennett [CUP 1996], p.375


A Reaction

In other words, there is a holistic aspect of understanding, which makes us ask how understanding ever gets off the ground. Is it not possible to understand a single idea in isolation?


The 43 ideas with the same theme [knowledge of sources, causes and explanations]:

Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato]
Knowing is having knowledge; understanding is using knowledge [Aristotle]
Understanding is the aim of our nature [Aristotle]
We understand a thing when we know its explanation and its necessity [Aristotle]
We only understand something when we know its explanation [Aristotle]
Some understanding, of immediate items, is indemonstrable [Aristotle]
Reasoning relates to understanding as time does to eternity [Boethius, by Sorabji]
Senses grasp external properties, but the understanding grasps the essential natures of things [Aquinas]
Understanding is the sole aim of reason, and the only profit for the mind [Spinoza]
We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them [Leibniz]
Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas [Leibniz]
For Leibniz, divine understanding grasps every conceivable possibility [Leibniz, by Perkins]
Kant showed that the understanding (unlike reason) concerns what is finite and conditioned [Kant, by Hegel]
Understanding essentially involves singular elements [Kant, by Burge]
Reason is distinct from understanding, and is the faculty of rules or principles [Kant]
All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer]
Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce]
We can only understand through concepts, which subsume particulars in generalities [Nietzsche]
To understand a thought you must understand its logical structure [Frege, by Burge]
To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts [Frege, by Burge]
Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt]
Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein]
It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that' [Salmon]
Understanding is an extremely vague concept [Salmon]
'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas]
Understanding is not mysterious - it is just more knowledge, of causes [Lipton]
In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick]
Modern epistemology is too atomistic, and neglects understanding [Zagzebski]
Epistemology is excessively atomic, by focusing on justification instead of understanding [Zagzebski]
Aristotle's proofs give understanding, so it can't be otherwise, so consequence is necessary [Smiley, by Rumfitt]
We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
There is intentional, mechanical, teleological, essentialist, vitalist and deontological understanding [Gelman]
It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew]
Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
Scientific understanding is always the grasping of a correct explanation [Strevens]
We may 'understand that' the cat is on the mat, but not at all 'understand why' it is there [Strevens]
Understanding is a precondition, comes in degrees, is active, and holistic - unlike explanation [Strevens]
'Grasping' a structure seems to be modal, because we must anticipate its behaviour [Grimm]
You may have 'weak' understanding, if by luck you can answer a set of 'why questions' [Grimm]
Unlike knowledge, you can achieve understanding through luck [Grimm]
Medieval logicians said understanding A also involved understanding not-A [Rumfitt]
Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya]