more on this theme
|
more from this text
Single Idea 13050
[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
]
Full Idea
The 'inferential' conception of scientific explanation is the thesis that all legitimate scientific explanations are arguments of one sort or another.
Gist of Idea
The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments
Source
Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 1.1)
Book Ref
Salmon,Wesley C.: 'Four Decades of Scientific Explanation', ed/tr. Humphreys,Paul [Pittsburgh 2006], p.24
A Reaction
This seems to imply that someone has to be persuaded of something, and hence seems a rather too pragmatic view. I presume an explanation might be no more than dumbly pointing at conclusive evidence of a cause. Man with smoking gun.
The
29 ideas
from Wesley Salmon
4784
|
Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation
[Salmon, by Psillos]
|
16557
|
Salmon's mechanisms are processes and interactions, involving marks, or conserved quantities
[Salmon, by Machamer/Darden/Craver]
|
8411
|
Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation
[Salmon]
|
8412
|
A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards
[Salmon]
|
8413
|
Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous
[Salmon]
|
13047
|
It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that'
[Salmon]
|
13046
|
Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar
[Salmon]
|
13045
|
Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms
[Salmon]
|
13050
|
The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments
[Salmon]
|
13049
|
We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things
[Salmon]
|
13051
|
Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain
[Salmon]
|
13053
|
A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference
[Salmon]
|
13054
|
Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations
[Salmon]
|
13055
|
Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence
[Salmon]
|
13056
|
Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability
[Salmon]
|
13057
|
Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies
[Salmon]
|
13058
|
Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation
[Salmon]
|
13059
|
Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts
[Salmon]
|
13061
|
Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering
[Salmon]
|
13060
|
Can events whose probabilities are low be explained?
[Salmon]
|
13062
|
Does an item have a function the first time it occurs?
[Salmon]
|
13063
|
Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts
[Salmon]
|
13064
|
The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic
[Salmon]
|
13067
|
For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations
[Salmon]
|
13065
|
Understanding is an extremely vague concept
[Salmon]
|
8409
|
Probabilistic causal concepts are widely used in everyday life and in science
[Salmon]
|
17093
|
Causation produces productive mechanisms; to understand the world, understand these mechanisms
[Salmon]
|
17492
|
Salmon's interaction mechanisms needn't be regular, or involving any systems
[Glennan on Salmon]
|
14366
|
An explanation is a table of statistical information
[Salmon, by Strevens]
|