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Single Idea 13051
[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
]
Full Idea
The deductive-nomological view has an explanation/prediction symmetry thesis - that a correct explanation could be a scientific prediction, and that any deductive prediction could serve as a deductive-nomological explanation.
Clarification
'Nomological' means concerning laws
Gist of Idea
Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain
Source
Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 1.1)
Book Ref
Salmon,Wesley C.: 'Four Decades of Scientific Explanation', ed/tr. Humphreys,Paul [Pittsburgh 2006], p.24
A Reaction
Of course, not all predictions will explain, or vice versa. Weird regularities become predictable but remain baffling. Good explanations may be of unrepeatable events. It is the 'law' in the account that ties the two ends together.
The
20 ideas
from 'Four Decades of Scientific Explanation'
13047
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It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that'
[Salmon]
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13046
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Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar
[Salmon]
|
13045
|
Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms
[Salmon]
|
13049
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We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things
[Salmon]
|
13051
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Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain
[Salmon]
|
13050
|
The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments
[Salmon]
|
13053
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A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference
[Salmon]
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13054
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Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations
[Salmon]
|
13055
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Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence
[Salmon]
|
13056
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Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability
[Salmon]
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13057
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Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies
[Salmon]
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13059
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Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts
[Salmon]
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13058
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Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation
[Salmon]
|
13060
|
Can events whose probabilities are low be explained?
[Salmon]
|
13061
|
Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering
[Salmon]
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13062
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Does an item have a function the first time it occurs?
[Salmon]
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13063
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Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts
[Salmon]
|
13064
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The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic
[Salmon]
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13065
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Understanding is an extremely vague concept
[Salmon]
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13067
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For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations
[Salmon]
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