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Single Idea 13051

[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations ]

Full Idea

The deductive-nomological view has an explanation/prediction symmetry thesis - that a correct explanation could be a scientific prediction, and that any deductive prediction could serve as a deductive-nomological explanation.

Clarification

'Nomological' means concerning laws

Gist of Idea

Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain

Source

Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 1.1)

Book Ref

Salmon,Wesley C.: 'Four Decades of Scientific Explanation', ed/tr. Humphreys,Paul [Pittsburgh 2006], p.24

A Reaction

Of course, not all predictions will explain, or vice versa. Weird regularities become predictable but remain baffling. Good explanations may be of unrepeatable events. It is the 'law' in the account that ties the two ends together.

The 20 ideas from 'Four Decades of Scientific Explanation'

13047 It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that' [Salmon]
13046 Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon]
13045 Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon]
13049 We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon]
13051 Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon]
13050 The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon]
13053 A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon]
13054 Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon]
13055 Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon]
13056 Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon]
13057 Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon]
13059 Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon]
13058 Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon]
13060 Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon]
13061 Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon]
13062 Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon]
13064 The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon]
13063 Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon]
13067 For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations [Salmon]
13065 Understanding is an extremely vague concept [Salmon]