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Single Idea 13054

[filed under theme 14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction ]

Full Idea

Various kinds of correlations exist that provide excellent bases for prediction, but because no suitable causal relations exist (or are known), these correlations do not furnish explanation.

Gist of Idea

Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations

Source

Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 2.3)

Book Ref

Salmon,Wesley C.: 'Four Decades of Scientific Explanation', ed/tr. Humphreys,Paul [Pittsburgh 2006], p.49


A Reaction

There may be problem cases for the claim that all explanations are causal, but I certainly think that this idea is essentially right. Prediction can come from induction, but inductions may be true and yet baffling.


The 18 ideas with the same theme [predicting events as support for a theory]:

Successful prediction shows proficiency in nature [Leibniz]
Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha]
Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon]
Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam]
Unpredictability doesn't entail inexplicability, and predictability doesn't entail explicability [MacIntyre]
The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben]
It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it [Lipton]
Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton]
Explanation does not entail prediction [Flanagan]
The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré]
A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos]
If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos]
Explanation predicts after the event; prediction explains before the event [Bird]
Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button]
What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross]
The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross]
If a theory can be fudged, so can observations [Scerri]
A system can infer the structure of the world by making predictions about it [New Sci.]