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Single Idea 13068

[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance ]

Full Idea

In the 'blueprint' approach to substance, we confront at least three questions: What is it for a thing to be an individual substance? What is it for a thing to be the kind of substance that it is? What is it to be that very individual substance?

Gist of Idea

We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances

Source

Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.1)

Book Ref

Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J: 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz' [CUP 1999], p.15


A Reaction

My working view is that the answer to the first question is that substance is essence, that the second question is overrated and parasitic on the third, and that the third is the key question, and also reduces to essence.


The 20 ideas with the same theme [varieties of entity that can count as substances]:

Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle]
Speusippus suggested underlying principles for every substance, and ended with a huge list [Speussipus, by Aristotle]
Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances [Aristotle]
Mature Aristotle sees organisms as the paradigm substances [Aristotle, by Pasnau]
Elements and physical objects are substances, but ideas and mathematics are not so clear [Aristotle]
Is a primary substance a foundation of existence, or the last stage of understanding? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Units are positionless substances, and points are substances with position [Aristotle]
Cut wood doesn't make a new substance, but seems to make separate subjects [William of Ockham]
Substances 'substand' (beneath accidents), or 'subsist' (independently) [Eustachius]
We can conceive of three sorts of substance: God, finite intelligence, and bodies [Locke]
We sort and name substances by nominal and not by real essence [Locke]
Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz]
Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz]
Substances are everywhere in matter, like points in a line [Leibniz]
Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many [Cottingham]
Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field [Heil]
We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Scholastics use 'substantia' for thick concrete entities, and for thin metaphysical ones [Pasnau]