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Full Idea
Socrates has no definition if definitions by their nature must be in purely general terms, and if no purely general terms can succeed in uniquely singling out this signated matter.
Clarification
'Signated' presumably means picked out
Gist of Idea
If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined
Source
report of Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], 23) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 1.1.2
Book Ref
Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J: 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz' [CUP 1999], p.17
A Reaction
There seem to be two models. That general terms actually individuate the matter of Socrates, or that they cross-reference to (so to speak) define Socrates 'by elimination', as the only individual that fits. But the latter is a poor definition.
| 13090 | The principle of diversity for corporeal substances is their matter [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 13070 | If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 11205 | If the form of 'human' contains 'many', Socrates isn't human; if it contains 'one', Socrates is Plato [Aquinas] |
| 11206 | The mind constructs complete attributions, based on the unified elements of the real world [Aquinas] |
| 11207 | A cause can exist without its effect, but the effect cannot exist without its cause [Aquinas] |
| 11208 | A simple substance is its own essence [Aquinas] |
| 11196 | Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories [Aquinas] |
| 11197 | The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things [Aquinas] |
| 11195 | If affirmative propositions express being, we affirm about what is absent [Aquinas] |
| 11198 | Definition of essence makes things understandable [Aquinas] |
| 11201 | Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject [Aquinas] |
| 11200 | The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas] |
| 11202 | It is by having essence that things exist [Aquinas] |
| 11203 | Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas] |