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Single Idea 13074
[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
]
Full Idea
On Suarez's account, only natural kinds and their members have real essences.
Gist of Idea
Only natural kinds and their members have real essences
Source
report of Francisco Suárez (works [1588]) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 1.3.1 n21
Book Ref
Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J: 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz' [CUP 1999], p.26
A Reaction
Interesting. Rather than say that everything is a member of some kind, we leave quirky individuals out, with no essence at all. What is the status of the very first exemplar of a given kind?
The
18 ideas
from Francisco Suárez
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16667
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Substances are incomplete unless they have modes
[Suárez, by Pasnau]
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17007
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Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity
[Suárez]
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16780
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Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree
[Suárez]
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16758
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The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being
[Suárez]
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16682
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Other things could occupy the same location as an angel
[Suárez]
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16743
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We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension
[Suárez]
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16742
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We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence
[Suárez]
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16665
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There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence
[Suárez]
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16666
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A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it
[Suárez]
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22143
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Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference
[Suárez, by Boulter]
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22144
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Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds
[Suárez, by Boulter]
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22146
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Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B
[Suárez, by Boulter]
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22145
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Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences
[Suárez, by Boulter]
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22147
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Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways
[Suárez, by Boulter]
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22148
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Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B
[Suárez, by Boulter]
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22149
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Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality
[Suárez, by Boulter]
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7563
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The old 'influx' view of causation says it is a flow of accidental properties from A to B
[Suárez, by Jolley]
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13074
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Only natural kinds and their members have real essences
[Suárez, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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