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Single Idea 13080
[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
]
Full Idea
When Leibniz has the grounds of de re counterfactuals in mind, a counterpart picture, we have argued, is at work.
Gist of Idea
Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals
Source
report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 3.2.2
Book Ref
Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J: 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz' [CUP 1999], p.118
A Reaction
If Leibniz were a 'superessentialist', then individuals would be totally worldbound (because their relations would be essential). Cover/Hawthorne argue that he is just a 'strong' essentialist, allowing possible counterparts. Quite persuasive.
Related Idea
Idea 12904
If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me [Leibniz]
The
31 ideas
with the same theme
[there are only closely resembling possible entities]:
13080
|
Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals
[Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
|
9176
|
Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics
[Kripke]
|
9221
|
The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins
[Kripke, by Sider]
|
11986
|
The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates
[Plantinga]
|
11987
|
Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently
[Plantinga]
|
11973
|
Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several
[Kaplan]
|
11972
|
Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties
[Kaplan]
|
16409
|
Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory
[Stalnaker]
|
16411
|
If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time
[Stalnaker]
|
16412
|
If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism
[Stalnaker]
|
16454
|
Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics
[Stalnaker]
|
16994
|
Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart
[Kripke on Lewis]
|
11974
|
Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do
[Lewis]
|
11975
|
If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart
[Lewis]
|
11977
|
Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts
[Lewis]
|
14404
|
The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way
[Lewis, by Merricks]
|
5441
|
Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me?
[Mautner on Lewis]
|
5440
|
A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else
[Lewis, by Mautner]
|
16291
|
In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings
[Lewis]
|
17579
|
Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations
[Inwagen]
|
11110
|
We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person
[Jubien]
|
12004
|
Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity
[Forbes,G]
|
13726
|
Counterpart relations are neither symmetric nor transitive, so there is no logic of equality for them
[Fitting/Mendelsohn]
|
14763
|
Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts
[Sider]
|
16239
|
To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept
[Hawley]
|
11000
|
If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts
[Read]
|
6133
|
If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy
[Merricks]
|
14402
|
If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker
[Merricks]
|
11890
|
De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts
[Mackie,P]
|
11892
|
Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation
[Mackie,P]
|
11893
|
Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar
[Mackie,P]
|