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Single Idea 13082

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities ]

Full Idea

In this complete concept of possible Peter are contained not only essential or necessary things, ..but also existential things, or contingent items included there, because the nature of an individual substance is to have a perfect or complete concept.

Gist of Idea

The complete concept of an individual includes contingent properties, as well as necessary ones

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (Of liberty, Fate and God's grace [1690], Grua 311), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 3.3.1

Book Ref

Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J: 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz' [CUP 1999], p.126


A Reaction

Compare Idea 13077, where he seems to say that the complete concept is only necessarily linked to properties which will predict future events - though I suppose that would have to include all of the contingent properties mentioned here.

Related Ideas

Idea 13077 Basic predicates give the complete concept, which then predicts all of the actions [Leibniz]

Idea 13083 The essence is the necessary properties, and the concept includes what is contingent [Leibniz]


The 22 ideas with the same theme [essence is different from necessary properties]:

An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle]
Some accidental features are permanent, unless the object perishes [Hobbes]
Nothing is essential if it is in every part, and is common to everything [Spinoza]
The complete concept of an individual includes contingent properties, as well as necessary ones [Leibniz]
A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz]
Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)]
'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)]
'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)]
Jones may cease to exist without some simple property, but that doesn't make it essential [Kung]
Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker]
The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar]
We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity [Jubien]
Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe]
The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K]
It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K]
Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K]
We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K]
We must distinguish the de dicto 'must' of propositions from the de re 'must' of essence [Simons]
Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis]
Essences are no use in mathematics, if all mathematical truths are necessary [Mancosu]
Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami]
Aristotelians deny that all necessary properties are essential [Pasnau]