more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 13095

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence ]

Full Idea

The essence of substances consists in the primitive force of action, or the law of the sequence of changes.

Gist of Idea

Essence is primitive force, or a law of change

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Foucher [1675], 1676)

Book Ref

Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J: 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz' [CUP 1999], p.222


A Reaction

[a 1676 note on Foucher's reply] It take these to be the two key distinctive Leibnizian contributions to the sort of metaphysic that is needed by modern science. Nature works with intrinsic essences, which are forces determining action.

Related Ideas

Idea 12714 The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz]

Idea 12723 The most primitive thing in substances is force, which leads to their actions and dispositions [Leibniz]

Idea 13193 Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz]

Idea 13092 The essence of substance is the law of its changes, as in the series of numbers [Leibniz]


The 24 ideas with the same theme [powers as giving the essential nature of each thing]:

The hidden harmony is stronger than the visible [Heraclitus]
Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle]
Giving the function of a house defines its actuality [Aristotle]
The essence of a thing is its effort to persevere [Spinoza]
What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways? [Locke]
The question is whether force is self-sufficient in bodies, and essential, or dependent on something [Lenfant]
The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz]
Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz]
My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz]
I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz]
There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz]
Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz]
Essence is primitive force, or a law of change [Leibniz]
Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies [Leibniz, by Garber]
The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins]
The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong [Fine,K, by Pasnau]
If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations [Heil]
We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg]
There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau]
Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]
A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]