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Single Idea 13096

[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces ]

Full Idea

I recognise, in the active force which exerts itself through motion, the primitive entelechy or in a word, something analogous to the soul, whose nature consists in a certain perpetual law of the same series of changes through which it runs unhindered.

Gist of Idea

The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1699), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 6.1.3

Book Ref

Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J: 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz' [CUP 1999], p.223

A Reaction

This is a hugely metaphysical account of force, contrasting with Newton's largely mathematical account. He very often says that force is 'analogous' to the soul, rather than that it actually is a soul. He never quite believes that monads are real minds.

The 26 ideas from 'Letters to Burcher De Volder'

13096 The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change [Leibniz]
13177 An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz]
19410 Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz]
19409 Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz]
11873 Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz]
13178 Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz]
19411 In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz]
19412 If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz]
12747 Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz]
13179 A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power [Leibniz]
13180 Space is the order of coexisting possibles [Leibniz]
13181 Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities [Leibniz]
13093 The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz]
19379 The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz]
13186 Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances [Leibniz]
13185 Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz]
13184 The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz]
13183 Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws [Leibniz]
12748 Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz]
12752 Only unities have any reality [Leibniz]
13182 Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz]
12749 Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz]
13188 The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz]
13187 In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz]
12722 Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz]
19383 A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him [Leibniz]