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Single Idea 13187
[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
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Full Idea
In actual things nothing is indefinite.
Gist of Idea
In actual things nothing is indefinite
Source
Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1706.01.19)
Book Ref
Leibniz,Gottfried: 'Philosophical Essays', ed/tr. Arlew,R /Garber,D [Hackett 1989], p.185
A Reaction
This seems to be the germ of the controversial modern view of Williamson, that vagueness is entirely epistemic, and that the facts of nature are entirely definite. Thus there is a tallest short giraffe, which I find a bit hard to grasp.
The
15 ideas
with the same theme
[treating some aspects of reality as inherently vague]:
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13187
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In actual things nothing is indefinite
[Leibniz]
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21628
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To say reality itself is vague is not properly intelligible
[Dummett]
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6978
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Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter
[Jackson]
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7987
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Nothing is true, but everything is exact
[Baudrillard]
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16129
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Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague
[Evans, by Lowe]
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16459
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Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries?
[Evans]
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16460
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Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right
[Evans, by Lewis]
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16457
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There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion
[Evans, by Lewis]
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8983
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If 'red' is vague, then membership of the set of red things is vague, so there is no set of red things
[Sainsbury]
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9064
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Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature
[Keefe/Smith]
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9599
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There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain
[Williamson]
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21629
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Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness
[Williamson]
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16219
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Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all
[Hawley]
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16223
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Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations?
[Hawley]
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6135
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A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent
[Merricks]
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