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Single Idea 13234

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic ]

Full Idea

Through much of the 20th century the conception of logic was inherited from Frege and Russell, as knowledge of a body of logical truths, as arithmetic or geometry was a knowledge of truths. This is odd, and a historical anomaly.

Gist of Idea

The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date

Source

JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.2)

Book Ref

Beall,J/Restall,G: 'Logical Pluralism' [OUP 2006], p.12

A Reaction

Interesting. I have always taken this idea to be false. I presume logic has minimal subject matter and truths, and preferably none at all.

The 23 ideas from 'Logical Pluralism'

13232 Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall]
13233 Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall]
13235 Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall]
13234 The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall]
13236 Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall]
13237 Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall]
13238 Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall]
13239 Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall]
13240 A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall]
13241 The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall]
13243 Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall]
13242 It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall]
13244 Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall]
13245 Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall]
13246 Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall]
13247 A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall]
13248 We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall]
13249 (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall]
13250 Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall]
13252 Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall]
13254 A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall]
13255 Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall]
13253 There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall]