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Full Idea
We are pluralists about logical consequence because we take there to be a number of different consequence relations, each reflecting different precisifications of the pre-theoretic notion of deductive logical consequence.
Gist of Idea
There are several different consequence relations
Source
JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 8)
Book Ref
Beall,J/Restall,G: 'Logical Pluralism' [OUP 2006], p.88
A Reaction
I don't see how you avoid the slippery slope that leads to daft logical rules like Prior's 'tonk' (from which you can infer anything you like). I say that nature imposes logical conquence on us - but don't ask me to prove it.
| 19058 | Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples [Dummett] |
| 9718 | Validity is either semantic (what preserves truth), or proof-theoretic (following procedures) [Enderton] |
| 10259 | The two standard explanations of consequence are semantic (in models) and deductive [Shapiro] |
| 10691 | Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall] |
| 13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
| 10753 | Logical consequence is intuitively semantic, and captured by model theory [Rossberg] |