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Single Idea 13276

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism ]

Full Idea

Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover and of the soul confirms the suspicion that form, when it is not thought of as the object represented in a definition, plays the role of the ultimate mereological atom within his system.

Clarification

'Mereology' concerns how parts make up wholes

Gist of Idea

The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom

Source

report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 6.6

Book Ref

Koslicki,Kathrin: 'The Structure of Objects' [OUP 2008], p.162

A Reaction

Aristotle is concerned with which things are 'divisible', and he cites these two examples as indivisible, but they may be too unusual to offer an actual theory of how Aristotle builds up wholes from atoms. He denies atoms in matter.

The 30 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about form specifying matter]:

24040 Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account [Aristotle]
24055 Matter is potential, form is actual [Aristotle]
12345 In 'Metaphysics' Z substantial primacy (as form) is explanatory rather than ontological [Aristotle, by Wedin]
11285 The form of a thing is its essence and its primary being [Aristotle]
16147 In 'Metaphysics' substantial forms take over from objects as primary [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
12071 Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances) [Aristotle, by Witt]
12084 Essential form is neither accidental nor necessary to matter, so it appears not to be a property [Aristotle, by Witt]
11251 Plato says changing things have no essence; Aristotle disagrees [Aristotle, by Politis]
16119 Aristotle's cosmos is ordered by form, and disordered by matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
16148 Aristotle moved from realism to nominalism about substances [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
16112 A substance is a proper subject because the matter is a property of the form, not vice versa [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
12002 Aristotle doesn't think essential properties are those which must belong to a thing [Aristotle, by Kung]
16164 Forms of sensible substances include unrealised possibilities, so are not fully actual [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
17043 Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential [Aristotle]
13276 The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
16756 Substantial forms must exist, to explain the stability of metals like silver and tin [Albertus Magnus]
16757 Hot water naturally cools down, which is due to the substantial form of the water [William of Ockham]
17007 Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez]
16585 Prime matter is free of all forms, but has the potential for all forms [Eustachius]
16620 A chair is wood, and its shape is the form; it isn't 'compounded' of the matter and form [Hobbes]
16034 Form is not a separate substance, but just the manner, modification or 'stamp' of matter [Boyle]
15953 To cite a substantial form tells us what produced the effect, but not how it did it [Boyle]
11181 Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)]
11184 Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)]
15959 If the substantial form of brass implies its stability, how can it melt and remain brass? [Alexander,P]
12140 Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody]
12346 Form explains why some matter is of a certain kind, and that is explanatory bedrock [Wedin]
24066 The form explains kind, structure, unity and activity [Koslicki]
10938 The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami]
16602 Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form [Pasnau]