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Single Idea 13283

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects ]

Full Idea

A building may be composed of proper parts which are themselves buildings; a particular pattern may be composed of proper parts which are themselves patterns (even the same pattern, on a smaller scale).

Gist of Idea

The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings

Source

Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 7.2.12)

Book Ref

Koslicki,Kathrin: 'The Structure of Objects' [OUP 2008], p.195


A Reaction

This strikes me as a rather important observation, if you are (erroneously) trying to establish the identity of a thing simply by categorising its type.


The 22 ideas from 'The Structure of Objects'

The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure [Koslicki]
Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki]
Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki]
I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object [Koslicki]
For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki]
Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki]
'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds [Koslicki]
If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up [Koslicki]
The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong [Koslicki]
Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki]
The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki]
Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki]
There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki]
Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms? [Koslicki]
Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one [Koslicki]
Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry [Koslicki]
There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species [Koslicki]
The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability [Koslicki]
Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures [Koslicki]
'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system [Koslicki]
Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations [Koslicki]
Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts [Koslicki]