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Single Idea 13285
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
]
Full Idea
Natural kinds are said to stand out from other classifications because they support legitimate inductive inferences ...as when we observe that past samples of copper conduct electricity and infer that the next sample will too.
Gist of Idea
Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one
Source
Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 8.3.1)
Book Ref
Koslicki,Kathrin: 'The Structure of Objects' [OUP 2008], p.204
A Reaction
A slightly more precise version of the Upanishad definition of natural kinds which I favour (Idea 8153). If you can't predict the next one from the previous one, it isn't a natural kind. You can't quite predict the next tiger from the previous one.
Related Idea
Idea 8153
By knowing one piece of clay or gold, you know all of clay or gold [Anon (Upan)]
The
48 ideas
from Kathrin Koslicki
15110
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An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct
[Koslicki]
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15111
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In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena
[Koslicki]
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15112
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If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary
[Koslicki]
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15115
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In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition
[Koslicki]
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15118
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A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation
[Koslicki]
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15116
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Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features
[Koslicki]
|
15113
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Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals
[Koslicki]
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15114
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Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs
[Koslicki]
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15117
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Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation'
[Koslicki]
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24065
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Structured wholes are united by the teamwork needed for their capacities
[Koslicki]
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24066
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The form explains kind, structure, unity and activity
[Koslicki]
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24067
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Hylomorphic compounds need an individual form for transworld identity
[Koslicki]
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24069
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Much metaphysical debate concerns what is fundamental, rather than what exists
[Koslicki]
|
17439
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There is no deep reason why we count carrots but not asparagus
[Koslicki]
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17434
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We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries
[Koslicki]
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17436
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We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse
[Koslicki]
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17435
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Objects do not naturally form countable units
[Koslicki]
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17433
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We can still count squares, even if they overlap
[Koslicki]
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14497
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The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure
[Koslicki]
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14495
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I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object
[Koslicki]
|
14496
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Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry
[Koslicki]
|
13266
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Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them
[Koslicki]
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14498
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For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times
[Koslicki]
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14500
|
Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties
[Koslicki]
|
14501
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'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds
[Koslicki]
|
13264
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If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up
[Koslicki]
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13258
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The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong
[Koslicki]
|
13281
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Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts
[Koslicki]
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13283
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The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings
[Koslicki]
|
13280
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Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution
[Koslicki]
|
13279
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There are at least six versions of constitution being identity
[Koslicki]
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13284
|
Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms?
[Koslicki]
|
13285
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Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one
[Koslicki]
|
13287
|
Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry
[Koslicki]
|
13286
|
There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species
[Koslicki]
|
14504
|
The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability
[Koslicki]
|
14505
|
Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures
[Koslicki]
|
14506
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'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system
[Koslicki]
|
13288
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Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations
[Koslicki]
|
13289
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Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts
[Koslicki]
|
17312
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It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations
[Koslicki]
|
17311
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Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence
[Koslicki]
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17309
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For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions
[Koslicki]
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17313
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Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times
[Koslicki]
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17314
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The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features
[Koslicki]
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17315
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We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions
[Koslicki]
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17316
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We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer
[Koslicki]
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17317
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A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena
[Koslicki]
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