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Single Idea 13287
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
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Full Idea
Candidate species concepts can be intrinsic: morphological, physiological or genetic similarity; or relational: biology such as interbreeding and reproductive isolation, ecology, such as mate recognition in a niche, or phylogenetics (ancestor relations).
Gist of Idea
Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry
Source
Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 8.4.1)
Book Ref
Koslicki,Kathrin: 'The Structure of Objects' [OUP 2008], p.212
A Reaction
She says the relational ones are more popular, but I gather they all hit problems. See John Dupré on the hopelessness of the whole task.
The
22 ideas
from 'The Structure of Objects'
14497
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The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure
[Koslicki]
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14496
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Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry
[Koslicki]
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13266
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Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them
[Koslicki]
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14495
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I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object
[Koslicki]
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14498
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For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times
[Koslicki]
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14500
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Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties
[Koslicki]
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14501
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'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds
[Koslicki]
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13264
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If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up
[Koslicki]
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13258
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The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong
[Koslicki]
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13281
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Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts
[Koslicki]
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13283
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The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings
[Koslicki]
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13280
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Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution
[Koslicki]
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13279
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There are at least six versions of constitution being identity
[Koslicki]
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13284
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Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms?
[Koslicki]
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13285
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Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one
[Koslicki]
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13287
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Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry
[Koslicki]
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13286
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There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species
[Koslicki]
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14504
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The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability
[Koslicki]
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14505
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Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures
[Koslicki]
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14506
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'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system
[Koslicki]
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13288
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Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations
[Koslicki]
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13289
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Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts
[Koslicki]
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