more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
First, a thing can be a part in a way that is relative to a time, for example, that a newly installed carburettor is now part of my car, whereas earlier it was not. (This will be called a 'temporary' part).
Gist of Idea
A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor
Source
Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
Book Ref
-: 'Midwest Studs in Philosophy' [-], p.61
A Reaction
[Cf Idea 13327 for the 'second' concept of part] I'm immediately uneasy. Being a part seems to be a univocal concept. He seems to be distinguishing parts which are necessary for identity from those which aren't. Fine likes to define by example.
Related Idea
Idea 13327 A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
| 13326 | A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K] |
| 13327 | A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K] |
| 13328 | Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K] |
| 13329 | An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K] |
| 13330 | An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K] |
| 13331 | Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K] |
| 13332 | Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K] |
| 13333 | The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K] |