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Full Idea
An expression is not counted as a name unless it succeeds in referring to an object, i.e. unless there really is an object to which it refers.
Gist of Idea
An expression is only a name if it succeeds in referring to a real object
Source
David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 3.1)
Book Ref
Bostock,David: 'Intermediate Logic' [OUP 1997], p.71
A Reaction
His 'i.e.' makes the existence condition sound sufficient, but in ordinary language you don't succeed in referring to 'that man over there' just because he exists. In modal contexts we presumably refer to hypothetical objects (pace Lewis).
| 18937 | If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer] |
| 18940 | It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege] |
| 18939 | In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege] |
| 6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
| 18943 | Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell] |
| 10426 | A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell] |
| 13361 | An expression is only a name if it succeeds in referring to a real object [Bostock] |
| 10429 | It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury] |
| 19001 | 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo] |
| 12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
| 18946 | Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer] |
| 18934 | Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer] |
| 18938 | Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer] |