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Full Idea
In the family of the Liar is the Knower Paradox, where φ(x) is 'x is known to be true', and there is a set of known things, Kn. By knowing a sentence is not in the known sentences, you know its truth.
Gist of Idea
If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth
Source
Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §4)
Book Ref
-: 'Mind' [-], p.30
A Reaction
[mostly my wording]
13366 | The least ordinal greater than the set of all ordinals is both one of them and not one of them [Priest,G] |
13367 | The next set up in the hierarchy of sets seems to be both a member and not a member of it [Priest,G] |
13368 | The 'least indefinable ordinal' is defined by that very phrase [Priest,G] |
13370 | 'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words' leads to contradiction [Priest,G] |
13369 | By diagonalization we can define a real number that isn't in the definable set of reals [Priest,G] |
13371 | If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth [Priest,G] |
13372 | There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar [Priest,G] |
13373 | Typically, paradoxes are dealt with by dividing them into two groups, but the division is wrong [Priest,G] |