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Single Idea 13373

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox ]

Full Idea

A natural principle is the same kind of paradox will have the same kind of solution. Standardly Ramsey's first group are solved by denying the existence of some totality, and the second group are less clear. But denial of the groups sink both.

Gist of Idea

Typically, paradoxes are dealt with by dividing them into two groups, but the division is wrong

Source

Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §5)

Book Ref

-: 'Mind' [-], p.32


A Reaction

[compressed] This sums up the argument of Priest's paper, which is that it is Ramsey's division into two kinds (see Idea 13334) which is preventing us from getting to grips with the paradoxes. Priest, notoriously, just lives with them.

Related Idea

Idea 13334 Contradictions are either purely logical or mathematical, or they involved thought and language [Ramsey]


The 8 ideas from 'The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference'

The least ordinal greater than the set of all ordinals is both one of them and not one of them [Priest,G]
The next set up in the hierarchy of sets seems to be both a member and not a member of it [Priest,G]
The 'least indefinable ordinal' is defined by that very phrase [Priest,G]
'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words' leads to contradiction [Priest,G]
By diagonalization we can define a real number that isn't in the definable set of reals [Priest,G]
If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth [Priest,G]
There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar [Priest,G]
Typically, paradoxes are dealt with by dividing them into two groups, but the division is wrong [Priest,G]