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Single Idea 13378
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
]
Full Idea
It has often been uncritically assumed that logic that was initially a tool for clarifying mathematics could be seamlessly and uniformly applied in the effort to clarify ordinary language and philosophy, but this has been a real mistake.
Gist of Idea
It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy
Source
Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], Intro)
Book Ref
Jubien,Michael: 'Possibility' [OUP 2009], p.-1
A Reaction
I'm not saying he's right (since you need stupendous expertise to make that call) but my intuitions are that he has a good point, and he is at least addressing a crucial question which most analytical philosophers avert their eyes from.
The
52 ideas
from Michael Jubien
11105
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We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be
[Jubien]
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11110
|
We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person
[Jubien]
|
11107
|
If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily?
[Jubien]
|
11108
|
Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities
[Jubien]
|
11111
|
Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities
[Jubien]
|
11109
|
If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world
[Jubien]
|
11106
|
If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary
[Jubien]
|
11112
|
Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity
[Jubien]
|
11113
|
Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds
[Jubien]
|
11116
|
Being a physical object is our most fundamental category
[Jubien]
|
11117
|
Haecceities implausibly have no qualities
[Jubien]
|
11115
|
'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses
[Jubien]
|
11118
|
Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual
[Jubien]
|
11119
|
De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences
[Jubien]
|
9963
|
If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed
[Jubien]
|
9962
|
How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations?
[Jubien]
|
9964
|
Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own
[Jubien]
|
9965
|
There couldn't just be one number, such as 17
[Jubien]
|
9966
|
The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure
[Jubien]
|
9967
|
'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not
[Jubien]
|
9968
|
A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities
[Jubien]
|
9969
|
The empty set is the purest abstract object
[Jubien]
|
13375
|
The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding
[Jubien]
|
13376
|
We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity
[Jubien]
|
13378
|
It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy
[Jubien]
|
13377
|
First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects
[Jubien]
|
13374
|
To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations
[Jubien]
|
13379
|
If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same?
[Jubien]
|
13380
|
Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object
[Jubien]
|
13381
|
Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original
[Jubien]
|
13382
|
Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement
[Jubien]
|
13383
|
If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay
[Jubien]
|
13384
|
Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility
[Jubien]
|
13385
|
Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like
[Jubien]
|
13386
|
If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things
[Jubien]
|
13388
|
It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence
[Jubien]
|
13391
|
Modality concerns relations among platonic properties
[Jubien]
|
13389
|
The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems
[Jubien]
|
13390
|
Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies
[Jubien]
|
13392
|
Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier
[Jubien]
|
13393
|
Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity
[Jubien]
|
13394
|
Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment
[Jubien]
|
13396
|
Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical
[Jubien]
|
13395
|
If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept
[Jubien]
|
13398
|
We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it
[Jubien]
|
13399
|
Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators
[Jubien]
|
13400
|
If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways
[Jubien]
|
13401
|
The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism
[Jubien]
|
13403
|
The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object
[Jubien]
|
13402
|
We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes
[Jubien]
|
13404
|
To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated
[Jubien]
|
13405
|
The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category
[Jubien]
|