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Single Idea 13386

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff ]

Full Idea

Under the Quinean (conventional) view of objects, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things.

Gist of Idea

If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things

Source

Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.5)

Book Ref

Jubien,Michael: 'Possibility' [OUP 2009], p.33

A Reaction

This is the bold nihilistic account of physical objects, which seems to push all of our ontology into language (English?). We could devise divisions into things that were just crazy, and likely to lead to the rapid extinction of creatures who did it.

The 17 ideas with the same theme [general masses which are fairly homogeneous]:

16771 A composite is a true unity if all of its parts fall under one essence [Scheibler]
6472 Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
16939 Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
15319 Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden]
15501 We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis]
15504 Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis]
17578 I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen]
12793 Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns [Benardete,JA]
13386 If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien]
13488 Mass words do not have plurals, or numerical adjectives, or use 'fewer' [Hart,WD]
15014 Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider]
12847 Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. [Simons]
12863 Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units [Simons]
12862 Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons [Simons]
12792 The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock]
12799 Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock]
17436 We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki]