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Single Idea 13398

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions ]

Full Idea

'The winner of the Derby' satisfies some horse, but only accidentally. But we could 'rigidify' the description by inserting 'actual' into it, giving 'the actual winner of the Derby'. Winning is a contingent property, but actually winning is necessary.

Gist of Idea

We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it

Source

Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 5.1)

Book Ref

Jubien,Michael: 'Possibility' [OUP 2009], p.124

A Reaction

I like this unusual proposal because instead of switching into formal logic in order to capture the ideas we are after, he is drawing on the resources of ordinary language, offering philosophers a way of speaking plain English more precisely.

The 30 ideas from 'Possibility'

13378 It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy [Jubien]
13375 The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding [Jubien]
13376 We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity [Jubien]
13374 To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations [Jubien]
13377 First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects [Jubien]
13379 If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same? [Jubien]
13381 Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original [Jubien]
13382 Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement [Jubien]
13380 Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object [Jubien]
13383 If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay [Jubien]
13384 Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility [Jubien]
13385 Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like [Jubien]
13386 If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien]
13388 It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence [Jubien]
13391 Modality concerns relations among platonic properties [Jubien]
13389 The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien]
13390 Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien]
13392 Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier [Jubien]
13393 Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity [Jubien]
13394 Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment [Jubien]
13396 Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical [Jubien]
13395 If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept [Jubien]
13399 Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien]
13398 We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien]
13400 If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways [Jubien]
13401 The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism [Jubien]
13402 We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien]
13403 The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object [Jubien]
13404 To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated [Jubien]
13405 The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category [Jubien]