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Single Idea 13399
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
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Full Idea
There are plenty of examples to show that ordinary proper names simply are not rigid designators.
Gist of Idea
Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators
Source
Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 5.1)
Book Ref
Jubien,Michael: 'Possibility' [OUP 2009], p.127
A Reaction
His examples are the planet Venus and the dust of which it is formed, and a statue made of clay. In other words, for some objects, perhaps under certain descriptions (e.g. functional ones), the baptised matter can change. Rigidity is an extra topping.
The
30 ideas
from 'Possibility'
13378
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It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy
[Jubien]
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13375
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The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding
[Jubien]
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13376
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We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity
[Jubien]
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13374
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To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations
[Jubien]
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13377
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First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects
[Jubien]
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13379
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If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same?
[Jubien]
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13381
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Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original
[Jubien]
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13382
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Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement
[Jubien]
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13380
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Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object
[Jubien]
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13383
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If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay
[Jubien]
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13384
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Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility
[Jubien]
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13385
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Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like
[Jubien]
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13386
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If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things
[Jubien]
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13388
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It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence
[Jubien]
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13389
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The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems
[Jubien]
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13390
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Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies
[Jubien]
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13391
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Modality concerns relations among platonic properties
[Jubien]
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13392
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Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier
[Jubien]
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13393
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Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity
[Jubien]
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13394
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Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment
[Jubien]
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13396
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Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical
[Jubien]
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13395
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If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept
[Jubien]
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13398
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We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it
[Jubien]
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13399
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Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators
[Jubien]
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13400
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If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways
[Jubien]
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13401
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The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism
[Jubien]
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13403
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The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object
[Jubien]
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13402
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We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes
[Jubien]
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13404
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To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated
[Jubien]
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13405
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The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category
[Jubien]
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