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Single Idea 13401
[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
]
Full Idea
I find it surprising that some philosophers accept 'coincident objects'. This notion clearly offends against commonsense 'naturalism' about the world, so it should be viewed as a last resort.
Gist of Idea
The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism
Source
Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 5.2 n9)
Book Ref
Jubien,Michael: 'Possibility' [OUP 2009], p.129
A Reaction
I'm not quite clear why he invokes 'naturalism', but I pass on his intuition because it seems right to me.
The
30 ideas
from 'Possibility'
13378
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It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy
[Jubien]
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13375
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The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding
[Jubien]
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13376
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We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity
[Jubien]
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13374
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To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations
[Jubien]
|
13377
|
First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects
[Jubien]
|
13379
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If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same?
[Jubien]
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13381
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Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original
[Jubien]
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13382
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Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement
[Jubien]
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13380
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Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object
[Jubien]
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13383
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If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay
[Jubien]
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13384
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Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility
[Jubien]
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13385
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Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like
[Jubien]
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13386
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If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things
[Jubien]
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13388
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It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence
[Jubien]
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13391
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Modality concerns relations among platonic properties
[Jubien]
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13389
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The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems
[Jubien]
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13390
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Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies
[Jubien]
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13392
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Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier
[Jubien]
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13393
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Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity
[Jubien]
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13394
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Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment
[Jubien]
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13396
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Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical
[Jubien]
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13395
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If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept
[Jubien]
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13399
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Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators
[Jubien]
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13398
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We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it
[Jubien]
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13400
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If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways
[Jubien]
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13401
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The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism
[Jubien]
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13402
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We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes
[Jubien]
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13403
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The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object
[Jubien]
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13404
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To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated
[Jubien]
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13405
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The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category
[Jubien]
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