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Single Idea 13403
[filed under theme 7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
]
Full Idea
The category of Venus is not 'physical object' or 'mereological sum', but narrower. Surprisingly, it is not 'planet', since it might cease to be a planet and still merit the name 'Venus'. It is something like 'well-integrated, good-sized physical object'.
Gist of Idea
The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object
Source
Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 5.3)
Book Ref
Jubien,Michael: 'Possibility' [OUP 2009], p.136
A Reaction
Jubien is illustrating Idea 13402. This is a nice demonstration of how one might go about the task of constructing categories - by showing the modal profiles of things to which names have been assigned. Categories are file names.
Related Idea
Idea 13402
We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien]
The
21 ideas
with the same theme
[general ideas about how to group what exists]:
16661
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There are two sorts of category - referring to things, and to circumstances of things
[Boethius]
|
21448
|
Categories are general concepts of objects, which determine the way in which they are experienced
[Kant]
|
5554
|
Categories are necessary, so can't be implanted in us to agree with natural laws
[Kant]
|
22078
|
Even simple propositions about sensations are filled with categories
[Hegel]
|
15634
|
Thought about particulars is done entirely through categories
[Hegel]
|
21920
|
No need for a priori categories, since sufficient reason shows the interrelations
[Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
|
16961
|
In formal terms, a category is the range of some style of variables
[Quine]
|
13127
|
Categories can't overlap; they are either disjoint, or inclusive
[Sommers, by Westerhoff]
|
13403
|
The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object
[Jubien]
|
17377
|
All descriptive language is classificatory
[Dupré]
|
8283
|
Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former
[Lowe]
|
13118
|
Categories are base-sets which are used to construct states of affairs
[Westerhoff]
|
13116
|
Maybe objects in the same category have the same criteria of identity
[Westerhoff]
|
13117
|
How far down before we are too specialised to have a category?
[Westerhoff]
|
13124
|
Categories can be ordered by both containment and generality
[Westerhoff]
|
13125
|
Categories are held to explain why some substitutions give falsehood, and others meaninglessness
[Westerhoff]
|
13126
|
Categories systematize our intuitions about generality, substitutability, and identity
[Westerhoff]
|
13130
|
Categories as generalities don't give a criterion for a low-level cut-off point
[Westerhoff]
|
10496
|
Monothetic categories have fixed defining features, and polythetic categories do not
[Ellen]
|
10497
|
In symbolic classification, the categories are linked to rules
[Ellen]
|
18564
|
Do categories store causal knowledge, or typical properties, or knowledge of individuals?
[Machery]
|