more on this theme
|
more from this text
Single Idea 13405
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
]
Full Idea
The person who introduces a proper name gets to pick its bearer, but its category - and consequently the meaning of the name - is determined by social use.
Gist of Idea
The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category
Source
Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 7)
Book Ref
Jubien,Michael: 'Possibility' [OUP 2009], p.179
A Reaction
New 'division of labour'. The idea that a name has some sort of meaning seems right and important. If babies were switched after baptism, social use might fix the name to the new baby. The namer could stipulate the category at the baptism. Too neat.
The
52 ideas
from Michael Jubien
11110
|
We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person
[Jubien]
|
11108
|
Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities
[Jubien]
|
11111
|
Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities
[Jubien]
|
11105
|
We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be
[Jubien]
|
11107
|
If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily?
[Jubien]
|
11106
|
If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary
[Jubien]
|
11112
|
Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity
[Jubien]
|
11109
|
If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world
[Jubien]
|
11113
|
Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds
[Jubien]
|
11117
|
Haecceities implausibly have no qualities
[Jubien]
|
11116
|
Being a physical object is our most fundamental category
[Jubien]
|
11115
|
'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses
[Jubien]
|
11118
|
Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual
[Jubien]
|
11119
|
De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences
[Jubien]
|
9963
|
If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed
[Jubien]
|
9962
|
How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations?
[Jubien]
|
9964
|
Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own
[Jubien]
|
9965
|
There couldn't just be one number, such as 17
[Jubien]
|
9966
|
The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure
[Jubien]
|
9967
|
'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not
[Jubien]
|
9968
|
A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities
[Jubien]
|
9969
|
The empty set is the purest abstract object
[Jubien]
|
13375
|
The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding
[Jubien]
|
13376
|
We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity
[Jubien]
|
13378
|
It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy
[Jubien]
|
13374
|
To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations
[Jubien]
|
13377
|
First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects
[Jubien]
|
13379
|
If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same?
[Jubien]
|
13381
|
Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original
[Jubien]
|
13382
|
Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement
[Jubien]
|
13383
|
If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay
[Jubien]
|
13380
|
Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object
[Jubien]
|
13384
|
Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility
[Jubien]
|
13385
|
Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like
[Jubien]
|
13386
|
If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things
[Jubien]
|
13388
|
It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence
[Jubien]
|
13391
|
Modality concerns relations among platonic properties
[Jubien]
|
13389
|
The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems
[Jubien]
|
13390
|
Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies
[Jubien]
|
13392
|
Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier
[Jubien]
|
13393
|
Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity
[Jubien]
|
13394
|
Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment
[Jubien]
|
13395
|
If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept
[Jubien]
|
13396
|
Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical
[Jubien]
|
13399
|
Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators
[Jubien]
|
13398
|
We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it
[Jubien]
|
13400
|
If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways
[Jubien]
|
13401
|
The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism
[Jubien]
|
13403
|
The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object
[Jubien]
|
13402
|
We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes
[Jubien]
|
13404
|
To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated
[Jubien]
|
13405
|
The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category
[Jubien]
|