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Single Idea 13417

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems ]

Full Idea

If experience shows that some aspect of the physical world fails to instantiate a certain mathematical structure, one will modify the theory by sustituting a different structure, while the original structure doesn't lose its status as part of mathematics.

Gist of Idea

If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status

Source

Charles Parsons (Review of Tait 'Provenance of Pure Reason' [2009], §2)

Book Ref

-: 'Philosophia Mathematica' [-], p.224


A Reaction

This seems to be a beautifully simple and powerful objection to the Quinean idea that mathematics somehow only gets its authority from physics. It looked like a daft view to begin with, of course.


The 3 ideas from 'Review of Tait 'Provenance of Pure Reason''

The old problems with the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle [Parsons,C]
If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C]
If functions are transfinite objects, finitists can have no conception of them [Parsons,C]