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Single Idea 13436

[filed under theme 7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism ]

Full Idea

In the visible corporeal world we see no chasms or gaps. All quite down from us the descent is by easy steps and a continued series of things, that in each remove differ very little from the other. There are fish that have wings, and birds inhabit water.

Gist of Idea

There are no gaps in the continuum of nature, and everything has something closely resembling it

Source

John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.06.12)

Book Ref

Locke,John: 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', ed/tr. Nidditch,P.H. [OUP 1979], p.446


A Reaction

This is a direct contradiction of Plato's claim that nature has joints (Idea 7953). Locke's claim doesn't sound very plausible for many cases, and the examples he gives are far from conclusive.

Related Idea

Idea 7953 Reasoning needs to cut nature accurately at the joints [Plato]


The 19 ideas with the same theme [belief that our categories can't or don't map reality]:

It is not possible to know what sort each thing is [Democritus]
Our words and concepts don't always correspond to what is out there [William of Ockham]
Ockham was an anti-realist about the categories [William of Ockham, by Pasnau]
There are no gaps in the continuum of nature, and everything has something closely resembling it [Locke]
Hegel said Kant's fixed categories actually vary with culture and era [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Categories are not metaphysical truths, but inventions in the service of needs [Nietzsche]
Philosophers find it particularly hard to shake off belief in necessary categories [Nietzsche]
Nihilism results from valuing the world by the 'categories of reason', because that is fiction [Nietzsche]
A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman]
Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine]
We don't want another new set of categories; we want a variety of flexible categories [Deleuze, by May]
Extreme nominalists say all classification is arbitrary convention [Quinton]
If some peoples do not have categories like time or cause, they can't be essential features of rationality [Cooper,DE]
Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions [Heil]
Ontological categories are like formal axioms, not unique and with necessary membership [Westerhoff]
Categories merely systematise, and are not intrinsic to objects [Westerhoff]
A thing's ontological category depends on what else exists, so it is contingent [Westerhoff]
Continuous experience sometimes needs imposition of boundaries to create categories [Ellen]
There may be ad hoc categories, such as the things to pack in your suitcase for a trip [Machery]