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Single Idea 13475

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts ]

Full Idea

A Fregean concept is a function that assigns to each object a truth value. So instead of the colour green, the concept GREEN assigns truth to each green thing, but falsity to anything else.

Gist of Idea

The Fregean concept of GREEN is a function assigning true to green things, and false to the rest

Source

William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 2)

Book Ref

Hart,W.D.: 'The Evolution of Logic' [CUP 2010], p.47

A Reaction

This would seem to immediately hit the renate/cordate problem, if there was a world in which all and only the green things happened to be square. How could Frege then distinguish the green from the square? Compare Idea 8245.

Related Idea

Idea 8245 The logical attitude tries to turn concepts into functions, when they are really forms or forces [Deleuze/Guattari]

The 20 ideas with the same theme [concepts as meanings, distinct from a word's reference]:

9839 Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett]
9947 Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
10319 An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
8488 A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
9190 A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett]
13665 Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro]
13878 Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates [Frege, by Wright,C]
7736 A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object [Frege, by Weiner]
17430 Fregean concepts have precise boundaries and universal applicability [Frege, by Koslicki]
8622 Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth [Frege]
18752 'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee]
19168 Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson]
11836 We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins]
12637 Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor]
12638 If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor]
12639 Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor]
12605 A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke]
12607 Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke]
13475 The Fregean concept of GREEN is a function assigning true to green things, and false to the rest [Hart,WD]
22290 The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated [Potter]