more on this theme     |     more from this thinker

Single Idea 1352

[filed under theme 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking ]

Full Idea

My thoughts, and actions, and feelings, change every moment: they have no continued, but a successive, existence: but that self, or I, to which they belong, is permanent.

Gist of Idea

Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't

Source

Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 4)

Book Ref

'Personal Identity', ed/tr. Perry,John [University of California 1975], p.109

A Reaction

The word 'permanent' may be excessive, but one could hardly say there is nothing more to personal identity than the contents of consciousnes, given how much and how quickly those continually fluctuate.

The 16 ideas from 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory'

23644 Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid]
23643 We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid]
1356 A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid]
1359 Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid]
21319 I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid]
21323 The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid]
21321 Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid]
1350 Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid]
21322 We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid]
21320 Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid]
1352 Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid]
1367 Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid]
21324 If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid]
21325 Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid]
21327 If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid]
1366 If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid]