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Single Idea 13570

[filed under theme 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence ]

Full Idea

There are necessities grounded in the individual real essences of things, and necessities grounded in the natural kind essences of things. In the first case, without the property it isn't that individual, and in the second it isn't a member of that kind.

Gist of Idea

Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership

Source

Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], Intro)

Book Ref

Ellis,Brian: 'Scientific Essentialism' [CUP 2007], p.11


A Reaction

This is the distinction we must hang onto to avoid a huge amount of confusion in this territory. I just say that ceasing to be that individual will presumably entail ceasing to be that kind, but not necessarily vice versa, so individual essences rule.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [necessity comes from the essence of actual things]:

The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle]
Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities [Aristotle]
Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Necessity is in reference to essence or to cause [Spinoza]
Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things [Ellis]
Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership [Ellis]
Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K]
Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K]
It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K]
Essentialism is often identified with belief in 'de re' necessary truths [Mautner]
If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities [Heil]
If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe]
Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe]
The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale]
Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale]
If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale]
We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs]