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Single Idea 13574
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
]
Full Idea
Natural kinds are distinguished from other sorts of things by their associations with essential properties and real essences.
Gist of Idea
Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences
Source
Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 1.02)
Book Ref
Ellis,Brian: 'Scientific Essentialism' [CUP 2007], p.21
A Reaction
I don't think I agree with this. I rest my notion of natural kind on the elementary realising that to know all about this kind you only have to examine one sample of it, as in the Upanishads. The source of such a phenomenon is an open question.
Related Idea
Idea 8153
By knowing one piece of clay or gold, you know all of clay or gold [Anon (Upan)]
The
35 ideas
from 'Scientific Essentialism'
13567
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Ontology should give insight into or an explanation of the world revealed by science
[Ellis]
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13568
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Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure
[Ellis]
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13571
|
Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences
[Ellis]
|
13570
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Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership
[Ellis]
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13569
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To give essentialist explanations there have to be natural kinds
[Ellis]
|
13566
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A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton
[Ellis]
|
13572
|
There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals
[Ellis]
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13573
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Universals are all types of natural kind
[Ellis]
|
13574
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Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences
[Ellis]
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13575
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If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial
[Ellis]
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13576
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Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities
[Ellis]
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13577
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Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape
[Ellis]
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13578
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The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists
[Ellis]
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13579
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What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds
[Ellis]
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13581
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Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke)
[Ellis]
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13580
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Causal powers must necessarily act the way they do
[Ellis]
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13582
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'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate
[Ellis]
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13583
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There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred
[Ellis]
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13584
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The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property
[Ellis]
|
13585
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The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions
[Ellis]
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13586
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Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures
[Ellis]
|
13587
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There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way
[Ellis]
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13596
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A causal power is a disposition to produce forces
[Ellis]
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13594
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The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties
[Ellis]
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13595
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Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world
[Ellis]
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13597
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Good explanations unify
[Ellis]
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13599
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Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation
[Ellis]
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13598
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Causal powers are often directional (e.g. centripetal, centrifugal, circulatory)
[Ellis]
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13600
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The point of models in theories is not to idealise, but to focus on what is essential
[Ellis]
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13601
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Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures
[Ellis]
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13603
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A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible
[Ellis]
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13604
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Real possibility and necessity has the logic of S5, which links equivalence classes of worlds of the same kind
[Ellis]
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9436
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The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it
[Ellis]
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13606
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Humean conceptions of reality drive the adoption of extensional logic
[Ellis]
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13607
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If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved
[Ellis]
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