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Single Idea 13576
[filed under theme 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
]
Full Idea
Strictly speaking, the distinction between two brands of necessity is one of grounds, rather than modality.
Gist of Idea
Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities
Source
Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 1.06)
Book Ref
Ellis,Brian: 'Scientific Essentialism' [CUP 2007], p.33
A Reaction
This idea I associate with Kit Fine. I like it, because it allows 'necessity' to be a univocal concept, which seems right to me. The types of necessity arise from types of things which already occur in our ontology.
Related Idea
Idea 9216
Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K]
The
26 ideas
with the same theme
[different ways in which things must be]:
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1690
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A stone travels upwards by a forced necessity, and downwards by natural necessity
[Aristotle]
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21389
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Carneades distinguished logical from causal necessity, when talking of future events
[Long on Carneades]
|
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21362
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Necessity is physical, logical, mathematical or moral
[Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
|
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9442
|
The only necessity is logical necessity
[Wittgenstein]
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13576
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Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities
[Ellis]
|
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6987
|
We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity
[Jackson]
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15291
|
There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given)
[Harré/Madden]
|
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16466
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Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false
[Stalnaker]
|
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14680
|
Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility
[Salmon,N]
|
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9205
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The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative
[Fine,K]
|
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15079
|
'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws
[Lowe]
|
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16533
|
Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities
[Lowe]
|
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8261
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Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute
[Hale]
|
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15081
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A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way
[Hale]
|
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15080
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'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true)
[Hale]
|
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13721
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'Strong' necessity in all possible worlds; 'weak' necessity in the worlds where the relevant objects exist
[Sider]
|
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19286
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'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p
[Hale]
|
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19288
|
Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities
[Hale]
|
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19290
|
Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary
[Hale]
|
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7800
|
Analytic truths are divided into logically and conceptually necessary
[Girle]
|
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4646
|
Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori?
[Baggini /Fosl]
|
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9482
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If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity
[Bird]
|
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13244
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Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations)
[Beall/Restall]
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10933
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Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility
[Rami]
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14703
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Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual
[Schroeter]
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14532
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A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence
[Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
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