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Single Idea 13577

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties ]

Full Idea

The paradigmatically 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, depending on how things are distributed in space and time. Shape is the obvious example. ...Other examples are number, size and configuration.

Gist of Idea

Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape

Source

Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 1.09)

Book Ref

Ellis,Brian: 'Scientific Essentialism' [CUP 2007], p.46

A Reaction

I'm finding it very frustrating that this concept is much discussed in current philosophy of science (e.g. by Bird), but it is exceedingly hard to pin down any exact account of these 'categorical' properties, or even why they are so-called.

The 29 ideas with the same theme [actualised properties, rather than conditional ones]:

11032 Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject [Aristotle]
11038 We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances [Aristotle]
9478 Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird]
12677 Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis]
12665 I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis]
12682 Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis]
12684 Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis]
5469 The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions [Ellis]
13577 Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape [Ellis]
9436 The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it [Ellis]
3430 Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim]
15464 The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis]
7031 Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil]
8572 Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis]
11956 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar]
6520 If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H]
4617 A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone [Heil]
18522 Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties [Heil]
4027 Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver]
14315 Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford]
14332 There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford]
14336 Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford]
14194 Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider]
9477 Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird]
9490 The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird]
9495 If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird]
9492 Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird]
14501 'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds [Koslicki]
16733 17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions [Pasnau]